collection as a survey of sites, ancient and modern, where parts of the complex idea of vision as an active, constructive process emerged. The individual chapters are well-crafted; notable among them are Margaret Atherton’s sensitive reading of the contrast between Berkeley’s and Descartes’s theories of vision, Peg Birmingham’s uncovering of the roots of the Greek concept of taste as rendered by Hannah Arendt, and Rebecca Comay’s somewhat polemic, but rich, recounting of the dialogue between Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno over the theological prohibition of images. The editor, David Michael Levin, author or editor of other recent volumes on the history and philosophy of vision (The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern Situation; Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision), has provided a lengthy introduction (63 pages) in which he adumbrates several of the motifs that are woven into the individual chapters and summarizes each chapter in turn.

This collection will profit a variety of readers. Those who are interested in the development of postmodernist philosophies will gain insight into their history. The book will provide much stimulation and pleasure for those fascinated by vision. Finally, for those psychologists and other social scientists frustrated by aridity and lack of vision in current theory and practice in their fields, Sites of Vision will suggest means for relief. Such readers, however, must bring their own ideas with them, ready to connect to the ideas presented in this text: with the exception of John Dewey, the subject of one chapter, there are very few psychologists or social scientists mentioned or cited. This may be as much a comment on the persistence of materialist, mechanist, and biological ideas of vision within psychology and the other behavioral sciences as it is reflective of the contributors’ intellectual origins.

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to actor parents whose early divorce left him to be reared by his maternal grandmother (a Protestant later sent to a concentration camp because the Nazis considered her Jewish). He succeeded at school and in sports but claims that he lacked sufficient combativeness truly to excel. He describes the rise of Nazism during the Weimar Republic and his revulsion at being forced to listen to Hitler’s speeches. Deciding he wanted no part of the Third Reich, he arrived in England at age 18, where he enrolled in psychology at the University of London—a strange prelude to later false accusations of fascism.

At University College, in the mid-1930s, Eysenck absorbed the Darwinian-Galtonian tradition, studying individual differences and the psychometrics of Charles Spearman, Karl Pearson, and Sir Cyril Burt (Eysenck’s Ph.D. supervisor). Eysenck describes five principles of that school. The first of these was that human beings were biosocial organisms, whose conduct was determined by both genetic and by social factors. The four others—including a mind-body continuum, reconciling correlational and experimental methods, abandoning distinctions between pure and applied psychology, and requiring proof for all assertions—can likewise be seen as part of a program for making psychology into a science and unifying, rather than compartmentalizing, knowledge.

Eysenck describes a mainly happy life. He was married twice (the second time to Sybil for 40 years) and had five children and several grandchildren. During World War II, he worked as an air-raid warden and later as a clinical psychologist. After the war, he visited the United States before founding his own department of psychology (1950) at the University of London’s Institute of Psychiatry. He also writes of his many intellectual friends and enemies, alliances and quarrels.

Other Eysenckian controversies include cognitive behavior modification (a therapy he helped pioneer), personality and crime, smoking and cancer, and ESP and astrology. The most contentious, however, was the issue of race differences in IQ. Simply considering the basis to race differences in IQ as an open question was enough to make Eysenck a political pariah. He was physically attacked at the London School of Economics, an attack this reviewer witnessed as a then graduate student at the L.S.E.

_Rebel With a Cause_ is a first hand account of the human nature wars of the 20th century, central to an understanding of social science history.

Reviewed by J. PHILIPPE RUSHTON, professor of psychology at the University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada, N6A 3C2.

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Each time one of Jacques Lacan’s seminars is added to the existing list of his officially published works in French, as happened with _Seminar V: Les formations de l’inconscient_ last year, the event produces massive excitement among his followers, although in most cases they have already read and discussed the seminar in one of the numerous earlier “pirated”