

The causal interpretation of a nonexistent correlation coefficient is a venial mistake — together with the combining of data for “litter size” and for physical, psychological, and sociological traits taken from different sources, it is a serious error. This proof proves practically nothing. Scientific standards nowadays demand that the same individuals have to show all differences at the same time.

The only way to get around these methodological problems is by the rigorous presentation of data, where the source of the data, the sample sizes, and the variances all are presented in tabular form. Only in this way can the reader get an impression of the weight of the arguments.

There is only one way (and only one) to prove the hypothesis: by the presenting of empirical data. Such a presentation means a comparison of mongoloid, caucasoid, and negroid populations who live under different environmental conditions but who have the same socioeconomic background. This is a simple 3 races by 3 environmental conditions design, controlled for socioeconomic status. This proof, of course, is the responsibility of Rushton.

From the perspective of science, the  $r/K$  theory applied to human races would be much sounder if it were reformulated back to its point of origin: humans, although genetically different, all have the potential of reacting to different environments (climatic, SES, or whatever) with different reproductive strategies. By using the  $r/K$  theory taken from behavioural ecology to explain the data Rushton presents, we might be able to explain the evolutionary success of the species *Homo sapiens* without prematurely concluding the mechanisms.

Despite the above issues Rushton's critics would have been much more moderate if the statements had not carried such serious political implications. H.P. Eysenck, in his talk at the 10th International Congress of Human Ethology, drew parallels between Rushton, Einstein, and Galileo Galilei. Eysenck stated that everybody, including Galileo and Rushton, should have the right to express his or her scientific ideas. This notion is basically correct. On the other hand, Eysenck assumes that Einstein did not know how his findings would be used for the construction of the atomic bomb and believes that Einstein was, therefore, not responsible for the “misuse” of his ideas and that this premise also applies to Rushton. This notion is basically wrong. A scientist indeed is responsible for what he says or publishes, like anybody else in our society. The misuse of scientific ideas does not remain “potential.” More than 50 years ago, Gobineau's ideas led to a human disaster in Europe. Racial laws and discrimination were neither new nor unique to the Germany of this period; even in 1913, Géza von Hoffman reviewed in his book *Die Rassenhygiene in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika* (München: Lehmann) the racial laws of various states of the United States, laws that followed ideas comparable to Gobineau's.

In contrast to the discovery of nuclear fission, which was completely new, history has shown with painful consequences to humankind how ideas about rank orders of races can be used for the political justification of injustice. Those physical anthropologists in the Third Reich who used the ideas of the inequality of races, and thus laid the groundwork for racial discrimination and the holocaust in this period, rightfully have been held morally responsible for their influence. In addition, anybody who thinks that in a democratic society potential ideological explosives will be defused by democratic processes is wrong, because the comparison between three races could be only the beginning. Ethologists like Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1989)

have shown how demagogic processes use humankind's tendency for the justification of ostracism. Given this background, the Rushton statements have great demagogic potential. In addition, these statements and the methods employed to prove them can be used to vindicate nearly every ethnic conflict and (feminists, watch out) even gender differences (Orientals>Anglo-Saxon [males>females]>Italians>Arabs>Blacks). These problems are known to Rushton: “*Fortunately a more enlightened research climate for the study of racial variation may be occurring, at least as indicated by the increasing popular interest . . . and the willingness of front rank journals to consider their differences*” (Rushton, 1988a, p. 1038). Public interest and articles in front rank journals indeed may create the factoids mentioned above. Because Rushton moves on highly sensitive ground, we wish he would see his responsibility more clearly and adjust his scientific methods and argumentation. It is a pity that Rushton's work in the area of  $r/K$  selection has these shortcomings, for his work on genetic similarity theory is sound and promising (Rushton et al., 1984).

Last, but not least, from the political perspective there are severe implications for human ethology (at least in continental Europe). Human ethology should never play the role that physical anthropology played in the past, namely, delivering (even involuntarily) arguments for fascist ideology. Thus, it is the responsibility of every human ethologist to prevent the misuse of the ideas he or she produces.

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### Comment on J.P. Rushton's Work on $r/K$ Differences in Man

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Given the fundamental importance of the  $r/K$  distinction to Rushton's work, there is singularly little on how the environments of the various races might have differed and the functional effects of these differences, though alternative explanations are sometimes discussed (e.g. Rushton & Bogaert 1988). For example, if the theory is correct, physical and ecological differences within groups, for example between the Dinka and the Pygmies, might be expected to be accompanied by behavioural and psychological differences similar to those between groups.

At present such within-group differences, if they exist, produce variance which could be masking the true extent of any differences between groups.

In conversation with Rushton, it is clear that he feels that the quality of evidence available, or likely to be available, about the ecological conditions of the various races is too poor to justify expenditure of research time on it, as an alternative to collecting other types of data. While this argument has considerable force, it does imply that the whole edifice of the theory could be built on foundations of sand. The differences between groups could instead, as I. Silverman suggested at the Edinburgh conference, be related to differences in male-male competition. If African peoples were better able to rely on plant food than Caucasian or Oriental peoples in colder climates, male involvement in feeding a family might have been less vital. As in recent African hunter-gatherers, female gathering would have been the main foundation of the diet. The limited responsibilities of the male hunters would have allowed them much more freedom of action to spend their time competing for women than hunters in colder climates whose families were dependent on their efforts. Equally if a northern hunter was killed or injured in a quarrel over women, his existing children might starve, while the children of a disabled tropical hunter might survive on what their mother could gather.

This explanation seems to me as convincing, and as uncontaminated by evidence, as that advanced by Rushton.

#### Reference:

Rushton, J.P. & Bogaert, A.F. (1988). Race versus social class differences in sexual behaviour: a follow-up test of the r/K dimension. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 22; 259-272.

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## Race: Differences, Concepts and Politics

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Jean-Philippe Rushton has provoked hot and antagonistic political controversy with his theory of racial differences in peoples' genetic selectedness along the r/K reproductive strategy continuum (Rushton, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c). In claiming consistent superiority, amongst several dimensions of behavioural 'advances', in the increasing order: Negroid, Caucasoid, Mongoloid populations, Rushton has been charged with giving unintended or even deliberate ammunition for ideologues of racial supremacy. Media dissemination of his theory will certainly have caused perceived insult and distress to many black people.

As I have argued against sociobiology's political critics — like Rose, Kamin & Lewontin (1984) — (Vine, 1985), in fact most of its offences are in the distorting eye of the beholder when hypotheses of genetic differences are advanced. Censoring dangerous ideas in science is a serious compromise of the unfettered search for truth — and evolution's value-neutrality is precisely what cannot preclude uncovering morally uncomfortable facts about our natures.

Yet truth is arguably not the pre-eminent human value in every case and context. At times the prevention of human misery is both closer to reproduction-related values which natural selection *does* promote, and more in accord with our

fitness-transcending, self-conscious, *moral* choices. There is at least an extra-scientific political case for particular caution in promoting ideas which stress only one, potentially divisive side of our evolution by highlighting genetic competition and differences (e.g. Bateson, 1986; Kitcher, 1985). Vine (in.prep.) examines the nature and limits of our political, moral, and scientific responsibility as ethological theorists and researchers, proposing ethical guidelines which would set some constraints on the publicizing of contentious claims about race differences — but would in no way obstruct the scientific discovery process itself.

My main concern with Rushton's ideas is, however, at that morally evaluative level closest to the scientific issues themselves. I make no attempt here to address other more technical empirical issues on which Rushton may deserve to be squarely challenged (e.g. Zuckerman & Brody, 1988; and I.S.H.E. 1989 conference papers by Feierman and by Silverman — cf. *Ethology & Sociobiology*, 10(5), 1989). But what I do wish to challenge is the intrusion of socially evaluative concepts, where the theory should deal rigorously with more value-neutral ones, if it is not to be unnecessarily and offensively more amenable to abuse by racists than is acceptable.

Differing cultural traditions will put social *value* upon a variety of human attributes *even if dominant human cultures regrettably strive to impose theirs on all dimensions of social comparison and judgmental preference. Thus hypotheses of Rushton's racial ordering for maturation rates, birthrates, longevity, sexdrive, and even temperament variables happen to be relatively free of cross-cultural uniformity as to what is judged most desirable. Blacks may feel proud of being attributed a higher level of sexual activity, for example — whereas puritanical Caucasoids from Christian and Muslim moral traditions value its reduction.*

This does not hold for intelligence, which is valued ubiquitously in some form or other, nor for Rushton's 'social organization' cluster of variables, which encompasses marital stability, mental resilience, law-abidingness, and altruism. The issue of racial variation in intelligence is one around which controversy still abounds strongly (cf. Flynn, 1988 on Mongoloid IQ scores). But here debates have been potentially constructive in exposing how readily the 'heritability' concept misleads us about how crucial favorable environments are for realizing performance manifestations of genetic 'potential'. This may also prove true through further investigation of Rushton's social variables *k* but meanwhile genetic differences are being held to underlie racially differentiated attributes for which the consensual norms relate high scores to *moral worth*.

Clearly the measures underlying this part of Rushton's research can be challenged as to how culture-fair they are — as is the case for another measure of moral maturity, namely that used by Kohlberg in his pursuit of scores for moral reasoning about justice and rights (Vine, 1986). The difference is that while Kohlberg pursues the safe, liberal hypothesis of human equality in moral potential, Rushton argues for ethnic variations. The latter claim is at least as analytically problematic in terms of disconfounding moral "advances" from co-variations in sociopolitical context, the legacy of imperialist domination, the content of normative codes and their relation to conduct, and — in cases like crime within multi-ethnic societies — the influence of prejudice itself. (For example, a recent British survey has revealed police selectivity in apprehending and charging blacks, while legal discrimination makes them mas-